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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #05395-84
19 September 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council *CS*

FROM: [REDACTED]
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Libya and Sudan

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1. With reference to the talking points on Sudan that I gave to [REDACTED] for your use this week, I wonder if there is another aspect to the Sudan situation that we ought to be alert to. Considering Qadhafi's new "moderate" stance, how does Qadhafi now view Sudan? More importantly, how does Nimeiri view Qadhafi?

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2. Nimeiri has seen King Hassan reach an unprecedented accord with Qadhafi. He has also seen the French strike an agreement with the Libyan leader that, once the French troops are gone, could again plunge Chad into internal conflict that Habre might not be able to control. Instability could once more engulf the Sudan-Chad border area, raising the possibility of Libyan exploitation at some future time.

3. Nimeiri no doubt has concluded that the US was caught by surprise by both developments, and that US interests in both Morocco and Chad have suffered. He may also calculate that the US will again seek his help in supporting Habre if the Chadian leader's position is threatened, and that we have only limited military assistance to provide him in compensation for his help to the US.

4. Considering Nimeiri's considerable internal problems, particularly the threat posed by Libyan-backed rebels in southern Sudan, might not Nimeiri seek an accommodation with Qadhafi in the hope that Qadhafi would withdraw support to the rebels? While there is no intelligence that Nimeiri is contemplating such an action, the US had

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virtually no warning concerning the French-Libyan agreement. I am not suggesting Nimeiri will attempt to mend fences with the unpredictable Qadhafi, but we ought to consider such a possibility and be alert for indications that he might do so.

5. It may be worth raising this point with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger.

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